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FRANCHISE REGULATION: OHIO CONSIDERS LEGISLATION
TO PROTECT THE FRANCHISEE
On May 11, 1971, Senate Bill 295 was introduced in the 109th Gen-
eral Assembly of the State of Ohio.1 As a disclosure type proposal, Sen-
ate Bill 295 is designed to protect the prospective franchisee from mate-
rial omissions of fact by franchisor-sellers. While the Ohio Division of
Securities is given the primary enforcement responsibility, perhaps the
most important aspect of this legislative proposal is that it establishes
a private cause of action for anyone injured from acts in violation of the
statute. The Ohio proposal comes at a time when the franchising sys-
tem of marketing is the target of numerous legislative attempts to free
the area of abuses. Although the federal government has yet to enact
proposed legislation to regulate the sale of franchises, several states have
either enacted or are now considering legislation to protect the fran-
chisee.' The possibility of a preemptive federal statute also raises
doubts as to whether the states should individually legislate to protect the
franchisee. This article will briefly view the abuses associated with the
sale of franchises and the movement toward disclosure statutes to remedy
the problem. The Ohio proposal will be considered in detail. Senate
Bill 295 is substantively similar to legislation being considered in several
states and is virtually a verbatim copy of the recently enacted California
disclosure statute. Major problems arise both during the franchise term
and upon termination of the contract which are not affected by disclosure
requirements. These problem areas will be considered in Part IV. Al-
though Ohio has not yet considered legislative action to correct abuses
beyond the initial sale, several proposals have received serious atten-
tion in other jurisdictions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Although franchising is not a new form of marketing goods and ser-
vices,3 the franchise distribution system has experienced a phenomenal
'Ohio S.B. 295, 109th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1971). S.B. 295 was referred to the
Senate Commerce and Labor Committee on May 12, 1971.
2 At least eight states and Puerto Rico have enacted legislation regulating various aspects of
the franchise relationship. See California Franchise Investment Law, CAL. CORP. CODE §,
31000-31516 (West Supp. 1971); Delaware Security for Franchise Distributors, 6 DEL. CODE
ANN. §§ 2551-2557 (Supp. 1970); New Jersey Franchise Practices Act, 56 N.J. STAT. AmN,.
§ 10, (Supp. 1972). An Act Relating to Franchisees and Distributorships, 3 FLA. STAT. ANN.
SEss. LAws, Chapter 71-61 (West 1971) (Florida); Arkansas Act Mfaking it Unlawful to
Discriminate Against Arkansas Franchisees and for Other Purposes, Arkansas General As-
sembly Act 252 (1971); Puerto Rico Dealers Act, 10 LP.R.A. §§ 278a-d (Equity Supp. 1971);
Franchise Investment Protection Act, WAsI. LAWS, ch. 252, 42d Legis., 1st Sess. (1971), as
amended, WASH. LAWS, ch. 116, 42d Legis., 2d extra Sess. (1972); Wisconsin Franchise Invest-
ment Law, WISc. LAws, ch. 241, 80th Reg. Sess. (1972).
a L KURSH, THE FRANc.HYSE BOOM 5-6 (1968), [hereinafter citei as H1 KuRS H].
The Coca-Cola franchise in Georgia was established in 1901; Rexal Drug Stores was in exis-
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growth in recent years.4  The franchise system has been acclaimed as the
most viable means of maintaining the existence of the small business en-
trepreneur.' The system has also been noted as a vehicle to open business
opportunities to women and minority groups." The franchisor and the
franchisee obtain great benefits from the nature of the system. The fran-
chisor is able to develop a vast system of distribution for his product at a
lower cost than if he were to attempt to finance and operate the system
individually. The franchisee is able to compete more effectively with
wholly owned chains because he obtains the backing of an organization
which is able to provide varied technical assistance and the economies of
a mass operation. The franchisor's image, tradena~me and system give the
local franchisee the benefit of large-scale advertising and a basis for con-
sumer acceptance.
Because of the nature of the franchise system, the franchisor retains a
great degree of control over the franchisee. The former has a legitimate
desire to maintain a certain level of product quality among all outlets.
Since the franchise is largely premised upon the concepts of referral busi-
ness and national advertising, the consumer expects to receive the same
quality product from each franchisee.7  Many franchisors, however, abuse
this legitimate concern for a standard quality by requiring the franchisee to
purchase equipment and supplies at exorbitant prices. Such requirements
have been the subject of successful lawsuits against franchisors based upon
antitrust theories.' Franchisors may also require overly strict operating pro-
cedures and policies in their attempt to enforce a standard quality, with
the violation of any contractual term giving the franchisor cause to termi-
nate the franchise relationship. Harold Brown, a leading commentator
tence in 1902. Western Auto Supply Company started franchising in the early 1930's and
now supports over 4,000 independently owned franchised outlets.
4 By 1970, the franchise system accounted for $90 billion in annual sales or 10 percent of
the gross national product. Over 25 percent of all retail sales are now attributed to franchised
outlets. Hearings on the Impact of Franchising on Small Business Before the Subcomm. on
Urban and Rural Economic Development of the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess., at 1 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Hearings]. See also BURCK, Fran-
chising's Troubled Dream W7orld, FoR'rTUNE, March 1970, at 118.
51970 Hearings, supra note 4, at 49. The courts have alk.o acclaimed the franchising
system as the savior of small business. One federal district court stated:
The franchise method of operation has the advantage, from the standpoint of our
American system of competitive economy, of enabling numerous groups of individ-
uals with small capital to become entrepreneurs.... If our economy had not developed
that system of operation these individuals would have turned out to have been mere-
ly employees.
Susser v. Carvel Corp., 206 F. Supp. 636, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), afl'd, 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir.
1964), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 381 U.S. 125 (1965).
6 H. KURSH, supra note 1, at 135-61. See also Sayre, Franch3sing in the Ghetto, 25 BUS.
LAW. 73 (Special Issue 1969).
7 H. KuRSH, supra note 1, at 46.
8 See, e.g., Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), ccrt. dismissed as improv.
idently granted, 381 U.S. 125 (1965); Dehydrating Process Co. v. A. 0. Smth Corp., 292
F.2d 653 (1st Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961).
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on the subject, has succintly explained the nature of the control which the
franchisor may have over a franchisee as follows:
There is a marked, intentional, and constantly emphasized disparity in
the positions of the parties--the franchisor combining the roles of father,
teacher, and drill sergeant, with the franchisee relegated to those of
son, pupil, and buck-private, respectively. At the core of the franchise
relationship is the contractual control exercised by the franchisor over
every aspect of the franchisee's business. Starting with the advertisement
which calls for "no experience," the franchisor inculcates the fran-
chisee with the necessity of being taught, guided, and controlled not
only during the initial training period but throughout the existence of
the franchise. The franchisor controls the site, commissary purchases,
purchases from other vendors, method of business operations, labor
practices, quality control, merchandising, and even record keeping. This
control is buttressed by the contractual requirement that the franchisee
must obey the commands of the Operating Manual as expounded by
the franchisor's supervisor, on pain of losing the franchise if he dis-
obeys them and under constant threat of such termination. And upon
termination, or failure to renew, the franchisee is confronted with the
covenant not to compete and forfeiture of his equity in the business.0
The picture of the strong franchisor and the weak franchisee is aggravated
by the mere fact that the former has a substantial economic advantage in
most instances. The franchisee has very often committed his total savings
to the franchisee fee and other necessary start-up costs. The franchisor, in
the meantime, is holding the franchise fee which is often substantial. This
marked economic advantage gives the franchisor a very real opportunity
to coerce the franchisee to accede to the former's demands.
The abuses associated with the franchise relationship can easily be con-
fronted at three "chronological" points:
(1) false and deceptive statements and material omissions by the fran-
chisor in the offer of sale;
(2) restrictive terms and unequal bargaining position during the term;
and
(3) unjustified termination or refusal to renew the franchise agreement
during or at the end of the term.
The regulation of the franchising industry which requires full disclosure
has received the most attention from legislators and commentators. The
franchise situation today is somewhat analagous to the status of the securi-
ties industry prior to enactment of federal and state laws requiring full
disclosure to the prospective investor. One state investigation concluded
9 H. BRowN, FRANCHsiNGs TRAP FOR THE TRUSTING 41 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
BROWN]. The basic abuses which Air. Brown refers to have been verified by hearings con-
ducted in several jurisdictions. See, e.g., 1970 Hearings, supra note 4; Clurman, A Report
to the Honorable Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General of the State of New York, on Fran-
chising, (Jan. 7, 1970) [hereinafter cited as N.Y. Att'y Gen. Rcp.); Interim Hcaring or, Fron-
chises before the Senate Insurance and Financial Institutions Committee, in Sacremento, Cali.
fornia (Nov. 7, 1969) [hereinafter cited as Interim Hearing].
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that the typical franchise offer "is either grossly inadequate, misleading,
insubstantial or non-existent as to material facts, and in general presents
a danger to the investing public."' 0 Among the major areas which may be
the subject of misrepresentation in franchise offerings are the investment
requirements of the franchisee, the earnings projected by the offeror, the
assistance to be given the franchisee, and the background of the franchisor.
Each of these items will be discussed below as they relate to Ohio Senate
Bill 295.
Whereas disclosure legislation does not affect directly the contract it-
self, legislation which regulates the bargaining positions of the parties
and the termination rights of the franchisor directly negates the contract
terms. The obvious response from those who oppose legislation to cor-
rect such abuses is that freedom of contract should prevail. The con-
temporary viability of this argument can be seriously questioned when one
considers the numerous federal and state laws which have been enacted
to override contractual provisions. The nature of the legislative proposals
to correct the abuses associated with termination and bargaining position
will be discussed in Part IV.
II. FRANCHISE DISCLOSURE LEGISLATION
A. Attempts to Use Existing Security Laws
The proposals for regulating the sale of franchises by means of legis-
lation requiring disclosure similar to existing securities laws is largely an
outgrowth of debate as to whether a franchise agreement is within the
meaning of "security" under the various securities laws.11 Those who fa-
vor the classification of the franchise agreement as a security argue that
the franchisor is seeking investment capital and should be subject to the
same statutory regulations which govern the sale of traditional forms of
securities. 2  Although the franchise agreement and certain types of se-
curities have many common features, the courts have been generally un-
willing to extend the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws to bene-
fit franchisees.
Much of this debate centers on the application of the holding in SEC
v. W. J. Howey Co. 3 where the Supreme Court was concerned with the
meaning of an "investment contract" which is one of the terms defined as
10 N.Y. Att'y Gen. Rep., supra note 9, at 2.
11 See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1970); OHio R3V. CODE
ANN. § 1707.01 (Page Supp. 1971).
12 See Goodwin, Franchising in the Economy: The Franchise Agreement as a Security Un-
der Securities Acts, Including lob-5 Considerations, 24 Bus. LA.M. 1311 (1969); Augustine
& Hrusoff, Franchising Under the Securities Act of 1933 and the California Corporations
Code, 44 Los ANGELES B. BULL. 555 (1969); Coleman, A Franchise Agreement: Not a
"Security" Under the Securities Act of 1933, 22 BUs, LAW. 493 (1967).
13 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
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a security by the Securities Act of 1933. Since the franchise contract is
more nearly like an investment contract than any of the other listed securi-
ty types, the Howey definition of an investment contract has been the
leading one in the discussion of whether the franchisee should be ac-
corded the protection of the securities laws. In the Howey decision the
Court said that an investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act
means:
[A] contract. . . whereby a person invests his money in a common en-
terprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter
or a third party.14
Franchisees who attempt to avail themselves of the protection of securi-
ties laws (based on the argument that the franchise is an investment con-
tract) will fail because of the requirement that they must rely "solely"
on the efforts of the franchisor. The typical franchisee obviously does not
rely entirely on the franchisor. Most of the litigants who have relied on
the Howey test have been participants in multi-level or pyramid distribution
schemes. While many courts have held that if a bare minimum of effort
is required of the participant the scheme is not an investment contract,
there is some recent authority that pyramid distribution schemes will be
subject to security laws30  The federal courts have generally refused to
make the federal securities laws applicable to franchise contracts.10 In-
14 Id. at 298-99 (emphasis supplied).
15A variety of marketing schemes have been presented to state courts by plaintiffs at-
tempting to invoke state securities laws for their protection. In Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.
v. King, 452 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. 1970), purchasers of cosmetics distributorships could receive
"finder's fees" for recruiting new distributors. The court rejected the application of the se-
curities laws, however, relying mainly on the Howcy test. The contract was deemed not a
security because the investors did not depend solely on the efforts of others for profit. Other
courts have held that individuals who had acquired purchase cards to distribute to others and
who later had received a commission on sales to the card holders did not purchaze a security.
See Georgia Market Centers, Inc. v. Fortson, 225 Ga. 854, 171 S.E.2d 620 (1969); Gallion
v. Alabama Market Centers, Inc., 282 Ala. 679, 213 So. 2d 841 (1968). Contra, Florida Dis-
count Centers, Inc. v. Antinori, 226 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1969). In Emery v. So-Soft of Ohio,
Inc., 94 Ohio L Abs. 357, 199 N.E.2d 120 (Ct. App. 1964), the court held that a referral
agreement whereby a seller of water conditioners agreed to pay buyers $100 for each name
furnished by the buyer resulting in a subsequent sale not a security. The court pointed out
that the buyer had to earn the commission by taking positive action, and thus could not rely
solely on the efforts of the seller. One year earlier a common pleas court in Ohio had decided
otherwise in a case involving the same water conditioner seller. Yoder v. So-Soft of Ohio,
Inc., 94 Ohio L Abs. 354, 202 N..2d 329 (C.P. 1963). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has come to the conclusion reached in Emewy by applying the Howay test. Commonwealth ex
tel Pennsylvania Securities Corm'n v. Consumers Research Consultants, 414 Pa. 253, 199
A.2d 428 (1964). With the heavy reliance on the Howcy test in the state courts, it eems
doubtful that the typical franchise agreement will be held to be a security since the franchisee
is actively involved in the operation of the overwhelming number of franches.
16 At last one federal appellate court has decided that a typical franchise agreement is not
a security under federal law. In Chapman v. Rudd Paint &' Varnish Co., 409 F.2d 635 (9th
Cir. 1969), the court followed the Howey test in deciding that a franchise agreement, Whereby
the distributor paid a $5,000 fee for the right to market a product, was not a security. Al-
though the advertisements for the sale of the franchise stressed that minimum effort was re-
quired of the distributor, the court found that the distributor did not rely solely on anothers
1972]
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deed, there is some evidence that the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion would oppose any definition, whether by the courts or by amendment
to the existing law, which would make most franchise agreements "securi-
ties."17
The "definitional" court battle will no doubt continue in those juris-
dictions where legislation is not enacted to regulate franchise sales. The
advent of disclosure legislation, however, may soon render the "franchise-
security" issue moot in a number of jurisdictions.
B. Legislative Action
Much of the debate over whether a franchise contract is a security was
spearheaded by a 1967 opinion of the California Attorney General
which stated that the sale of a franchise in certain instances is the sale of a
security.'" The net result of this opinion and the resulting application of
the California securities laws to franchise contracts was confusion."0 To
remedy the situation, the Commissioner of Corporations called for the
drafting of specific legislation to require disclosure in the sale of fran-
chises. 20  An investigation of franchising by a California Senate Commit-
tee2 provided the basis for the resulting Franchise Investment Law.- This
efforts. See also Drug Management, Inc. v. Dart Drug Corp., 1961-64 CCH FlD. Sr C. LAW
REP. 5 91,293 (D.D.C. 1962). See generally, Goodwin, Franchijing in the Economy: The
Agreement as a Security Under the Securities Acts, Including 1Ob-5 Considerations, 24 BUs. LAW.
1311 (1969); Coleman, A Franchise Agreement: Not a "Security" Under the Securities Act of
1933, 22 Bus. LAW. 493 (1967).
17 On the contrary, "if disclosure is to be obtained in the franchising area, this should be
by the enactment of separate legislation rather than ... by simply changing the definition of
security in the Securities Act so as to make a franchise a security thereunder." Statement of
Philip A. Loomis, Jr., General Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission, in 1970 Hear.
ings, supra note 4, at 706 (emphasis supplied). The SEC has recently issued a release regard-
ing the application of the federal securities laws to the multi-level distributorship and pyra-
mid sales plans. Securities Act of 1933, Release No. 5211, Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Release No. 9387, (November 30, 1971). The Commission's view is that certain pyramid
schemes are inherently fraudulent and that the antifraud provisions of the securities laws will
be used to benefit prospective investors in such sales promotions. The SEC release agreed
with the Supreme Court of Hawaii which held that the broad protection of the securities
laws should be accorded investors even where the investors participate to a limited degree. State
v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc., 485 P.2d 105 (Hawaii 1971). Thus, the strict test developed In
Howey, that the profits must come "solely from the efforts" of others, may no longer protect
certain schemes of marketing distributorships from the securities laws.
18 49 Op's. CAL. AT'r'Y GEN. 124 (1967). The opinion was largely based on the "risk capi-
tal" theory developed by the Supreme Court of California in Silver Hills Country Club v.
Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961). If the franchisor se-
cured a substantial percentage of his risk capital from franchise fees, the franchise was a se-
curity (specifically an investment contract) for purposes of the California securities law. CAL.
CORP. CODE § 25019 (West Supp. 1971). For an excellent discussion of the opinion, sea
Augustine & Hrusoff, Franchise Regulation, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 1347, 1353-64 (1970). See
also Note, Franchise Regulation Under the California Corporate Secrilties Law, 5 SAN DInGO
L.R. 140 (1968).
19Pierno, Franchise Regulation-The Need for a New Approach, 44 Los ANGEI3is B.
BULL. 501 (1969).
201d. at 535.
21 Interim Hearing, note 9 supra.
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act, used as a model for the Ohio proposal, has been acclaimed as "the
first major piece of legislation aimed at protecting the consumer from un-
ethical franchising techniques and practices."M
The possibility of federal legislation complicates the issue as to whether
the state legislatures should enact disclosure requirements at this time, but
to date, only two federal proposals have received actual consideration. Af-
ter extensive hearings,24 the "Franchise Full Disclosure Act of 1970" was
introduced by Senator Williams.2 This bill required registration with the
Securities and Exchange Commission [hereinafter SEC] as well as disclo-
sure of material facts to the prospective franchisee. The disclosure re-
quirements were essentially the same as those proposed by Ohio Senate Bill
295,26 however, unlike the existing security registration and disclosure acts,
the Williams proposal would have granted triple damages to the injured
franchisee.
Perhaps the crucial threshold issue of "who" should regulate has re-
sulted in reluctance on the part of some legislative bodies to proceed with
a regulatory program. The "Franchise Full Disclosure Act of 1970"
specifically refrained from preempting state legislation,- but the franchisors
are on record as favoring only federal legislation if it is determined that
any legislation is necessary."' The franchisor's argument is that, practi-
cally, it will be nearly impossible to comply with different state statutes
simultaneously. Although uniform state laws are a possible alternative,
the likelihood of any movement in this direction would probably take
many years.
Although the "Franchise Full Disclosure Act of 1970" was not re-
ported out of committee,21 Senator Williams introduced another disclosure
proposal in 1971.30 The 1971 proposal would be preemptive, thus resolv-
ing the fears that the various state enactments would be so different as to
make compliance difficult, if not impossible. The most recent proposal
by Senator Williams also differs substantively in its regulatory scheme.
2 2 C AL CORP. CODE §§ 31000-31516 (West Supp. 1971).
2 CONTmENTAL FRANCHSE Rnv, Aug. 10, 1970, at 3.
241970 Hearings, note 4 supra.
25S. 3844, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
26 Id. § 7. See Appendix A.
271d. § 11. Jurisdiction provisions also denied removal to a federal court if the action
was commenced in a state court of competent jurisdiction. S. 3844, 91st Cong., 2d Se& §
18 (1970).
2 Statement on Behalf of the International Franchise Association Before Federal Trade
Commission Hearing on Proposed Trade Regulation Rule, by Philip F. Zeidman, General
Counsel, International Franchise Association, Feb. 14, 1972, on file in the office of the Ohio State
Law Journal.
29 Many prior federal attempts to legislate in the franchising area were similarly unsuccess-
ful. See Zeidman, Legislative Super'ision of the Franchise Contract: Throuing Out the Baby
with the Bath Water?, 15 N.Y.L.E 19 (1969).
30 S. 2399, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). This bill was introduced on August 2, 1971.
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The Federal Trade Commission [hereinafter referred to as FTC], rather
than the SEC, would be given the power to promulgate regulations relative
to disclosure. Any failure to comply with the regulations would be a vio-
lation of § 5 of the FTC Act,3' and the franchisee would be given a pri-
vate cause of action for treble damages. This proposal would be the first
departure from the existing norm under § 5 which, presently, does not pro-
vide for private actions.
Perhaps in anticipation of the enactment of Senator Williams' 1971
proposal, the FTC recently held hearings on a Trade Regulation Rule
which would require disclosure by franchisors.3 2  The disclosure require-
ments are substantially identical to the California Franchise Investment
Law and the Ohio proposal. Under the proposed Trade Regulation Rules,
the franchisor would be required to furnish the prospective franchisee a
single package of designated items of information at the first contact. In
addition, the proposed rule would give the franchisee a ten day "cooling-
off" period to cancel the contract with a refund of any fees paid to the
franchisor. Another provision would preserve the franchisee's defenses
and claims if he signed a promissory note which was subsequently assigned
by the franchiser to a third party. This FTC proposal would clearly go be-
yond the basic disclosure requirements and give the franchisee important
substantive rights. The proposed Trade Regulation Rule would provide
an enforcement capability which would partially fill the void currently
existing in this area, since most states have not yet enacted legislation re-
quiring disclosure by franchisors. Perhaps the proposal will serve as a
model for state disclosure legislation in the future, thereby encouraging uni-
formity.
The FTC proposal, however, has two major drawbacks. First, no pro-
vision is made for private actions based upon violations of the disclosure
rules. Thus, while many prospective franchisees may be protected by the
FTC policing effort, the injured franchisee must still resort to common
law fraud and contract theories for relief. The second and more basic
shortcoming of the Trade Regulation Rules is that the FTC may not have
the authority to issue such regulations with the effect of law without en-
abling legislation. Less than two months after the public hearings on the
proposed franchise disclosure Trade Regulation Rules were closed, a fed-
eral court held that the FTC Act did not confer the nuthority to promul-
gate such rules with the effect of substantive law.33 Specific legislation,
either establishing such rules directly or delegating the power to promul-
gate such rules to the FTC is necessary. The recent bill introduced by
3' 15 U.S.C. § 41-58 (1970).
32 16 C.F.R. 436 (1972). Hearings on the proposed rule were held on February 14.16,
1972.
3 National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n. v. FTC, 340 F. Supp. 1343 (D.D.C. 1972).
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Senator Williams would rectify the above defectsU Under this proposal,
the franchisee is given a private cause of action based on a violation by
the franchisor of the disclosure requirements. The Williams bill would
specify the disclosure requirements and give the FTC the power to promul-
gate rules to implement and enforce the regulatory scheme.
It is obvious that the current status of federal action to regulate fran-
chise sales is not clear. If Congress enacts a preemptive disclosure bill,
the Ohio proposal would be of limited utility except, perhaps, to regulate
purely intrastate franchise sales. Since the track record for federal pro-
posals to date is not promising for the proponents of federal legislation,
perhaps the best that can be achieved at this time is uniform state legisla-
tion. With this in mind, the Ohio General Assembly may find it desirable
to initiate a regulatory program to protect prospective franchisees from
fraud and misrepresentation. If the disclosure rules in the various states
are substantially identical, the franchisor will be able to use the same basic
information and data in his registration application and prospectus. The
statutes may differ as to administration and remedies without casting any
undue burden on the multistate franchisor.
III. THE PROPOSED OHIO DISCLOSuRE BILL
A. An Overview
Ohio S.B. 295 is a modified full disclosure act which gives primary ad-
ministrative and enforcement powers to the Division of Securities. Since
this state agency also supervises the Ohio Securities Act, 0 the Division
arguably possesses the expertise and administrative machinery necessary to
implement and administer the franchise disclosure legislation. By exempt-
ing franchises from regulation under the state securities laws, 7t S.B. 295
will effectively end the debate in Ohio on the issue of whether a franchise
is within the definition of a "security." 38
As a modified disclosure bill, S.B. 295 regulates only the initial stages
of the franchise transaction; the proposal does not attempt to correct
abuses which may arise during the franchise term or with termination of the
34 S. 2399, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
35 Ohio S. B. 295, 109th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (introduced May 11, 1971) [hereinafter
cited as S. B. 295). This bill, which was introduced by Senators Cook, Matia, Corts, Poda,
Secrest, and Leedy, is designed to enact sections 1705.01 to 1705.38 inclusive, and 1705.99, and
to amend sections 1707.03, 1707.19, 1707.46, and 4735.18, relative to the sale of franchises.
The proposal is substantially identical to the California Franchise Investment Law, CAL. CORP.
CODE §§ 31000-31516 (West Supp. 1971).
36 OIHO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.23 (Page 1964).
3 7 S.B. 295 § 1707.03(T).
38 OHo REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.01 (Page Supp. 1971). Sco Emery v. So-Soft of Ohio,
Inc., 199 N.E.2d 120 (Ohio Ct. App. 1964); Yoder v. So-Soft of Ohio, Inc., 94 Ohio LAbs. 354,
202 N.E.2d 329 (C.P. 1963). See generally Coffey, The Economic Rcalities of a "$ccurit": Is
There a Afore feaningful Formula?, 18 Case W. Res. L. Rev 367 (1967).
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contract. The mandatory disclosure scheme is designed to prevent fraud
and misrepresentation by the franchisor by providing the prospective fran-
chisee with the data necessary to make an informed decision whether to
execute the franchise agreement." Disclosure is accomplished by requir-
ing the franchisor to file an application for registration of the offer to sell
a franchise with the Division of Securities. Disclosure of specified facts
must be included in the application, and a prospectus, containing the same
information, must be delivered to the prospective purchaser prior to execu-
tion of the franchise contract. Registration is effective for one year;
renewal applications must be submitted prior to the expiration of the regis-
tration.40 All applications must be sworn to by the franchisor.41 To ease
the initial filing burden for franchisors, the applicant may incorporate by
reference any document previously filed with the Division of Securities as
required by the Ohio securities laws.2
The proposed Ohio law also limits the persons who may offer or sell
franchise agreements. Three classes of salesmen are authorized:
(1) persons identified in the application;
(2) persons licensed in Ohio as real estate brokers or salesmen; and
(3) persons licensed in Ohio as security dealers or salesmen.43
The California drafters considered this alternative preferable to licensing
individuals as franchise salesmen. The franchisor's representative, if
named in the application for registration, is a qualified salesman unless
the Division of Securities orders suspension of the proposed registration
based upon information required to be disclosed.44
The proposal is referred to as a "modified" disclosure bill because it
grants the Division of Securities the power to prevent varied abuses in the
offering and sale of franchises.45 The Division may, for example, issue
39See CAL. CORP. CODE § 31001 (West Supp. 1971). S.B. 295 does not contain a similar
section stating the purpose of the legislation.
40 S.B. 295 § 1705.09. The proposed bill also imposes the following filing fees to cover the
cost of administration: $200 for the initial registration, $50 for renewal applications, and $25
for filing an advertisement required to be submitted under § 1705.14. S.B. 295 § 1705.35.
The implementation of the California Franchise Investment Law did not require an increase
in staff of the Department of Corporations. During the first year in which the California
law was effective, 246 applications for registration were filed. Letter from W. R. Barnes to
the Ohio State Law Journal, Feb. 29, 1972.
41 S.B. 295 § 1705.08.
42 Id. § 1705.30.
43Id. § 1705.17. The licensing of franchise salesmen has been proposed as an alternative
to the limiting of franchise salesmen which has been proposed in the Ohio bill and adopted
in the California law.
44 See S.B. 295 §§ 1707.06(E), 1705.11(C).
4 5 There are three basic types of regulatory programs which can be utilized to control or
monitor franchise offerings. First, a permit bill which complete y subjects any franchisor
offering his system or plan for sale within a state to the authority and discretion of the ad.
ministrator of that state's law. With the permit-type program, the state can effectively pro-
hibit any franchisor from selling in the state. Permit bills generally provide for total regula.
tioa like, for example, the system of regulating common carriers in Ohio and other jurisdlc.
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stop orders, require the escrow of franchise fees and prohibit deceptive
advertising. In other words, the Division may take positive action to pre-
vent abuses, rather than merely functioning as a depository of public infor-
mation or as a prosecutor. The Division is given the authority to take
action to protect the franchisee's investment at the initial stage of the de-
velopment of the franchise contract.
B. Which Franchisors Must Register?
To determine which franchisors must register and disclose the required
data to prospective franchisees, several sections of S.B. 295 must be con-
sidered. The definitions of "franchise" and "franchise fee" must be con-
sidered in conjunction with the more straightforward jurisdictional ele-
ments of the statute. The jurisdictional requirements are basically de-
signed to provide protection to the franchisee domiciled in Ohio where
the franchise is to be operated in Ohio. If the offer or acceptance of the
franchise agreement occurs within the State of Ohio, the necessary contact
with the state exists to justify the application of the law. 6 Thus, where
the franchisor offers a franchise for sale, which offer is found to have
been made in Ohio, the statute will apply.47  If the offer and acceptance
occur outside the State of Ohio, the statute will not apply unless the
franchisee is domiciled within Ohio and the business is to be operated with-
in Ohio. S.B. 295 will not apply to contracts executed outside the State of
Ohio even where the franchise is to be operated in Ohio, if the franchisee
is not an Ohio resident, because there is no justification for imposing
Ohio's disclosure laws in a situation where the only contact with the State
of Ohio is the subsequent operation of the business. The proposal also
states when an offer or an acceptance is considered to have been made with-
in this state1 The proposal exempts offers in publications where the paid
circulation of the media is more than two-thirds outside the state, and ra-
dio or television offers are exempt when the programming originates out-
tions. Second, a pure disclosure statute which may be used to compel the franchisor to pro-
vide the franchise with relevant date. The pure disdosure statute, however, does not give
the state agency the authority to make a qualitative judgment as to the merits of the proposed
franchise sale. Thus, the third type of regulation, the modified disclosure act, may be viewed
as somewhere between the permit and pure disclosure statutes. The modified disclosure stat-
ute provides for full and adequate disclosure, but in addition the modification grants state
administrators the power to prevent certain related abuses. The administration of the modi-
fied act necessarily requires the state agency to make a judgment as to the quality of the of-
fer and the probability that the franchisor will indeed fulfill his promises to establish and
support the new franchise. If the judgment is that the franchisee's interests deserve protec-
tion, then the state agency can issue various orders to protect the franchisee's initial invest-
ment.
46See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
47 S.. 295 § 1705.02(A).
48 d.
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side the state. 9 The above jurisdictional limitations present no insur-
mountable problems of interpretation, but the definitions of several key
terms will, undoubtedly, cause some difficulty of interpretation.
Section 1705.01 includes all definitions to be used in reference to S.B.
295. The most difficult term to define is the word "franchise" itself. The
word has been used most often in a very general sense.50 The application
of the proposed bill is narrowed significantly by the definition of "fran-
chise" and by specific exemption provisions included in the bill.
S.B. 295 defines "franchise" as an agreement, written or oral, which:
(1) grants the right to engage in a business under a plan prescribed in
substantial part by a franchisor, and
(2) such plan is substantially associated with the franchisor's commer-
cial symbol, and
(3) the franchisee is required to pay a franchise fee.5"
Note that this definition limits the application of the law to those transac-
tions where all three of the stated elements exist. The intent is to exempt
what might commonly be called a "franchise" where the agreement is
merely a dealership. The normal retail dealer agreement where the retailer
sells a variety of goods produced by a number of manufacturers, as an
"exclusive area dealer" or an "authorized dealer," will not be subject to
the proposed law because in the normal situation the dealer does not pay
a franchise fee.
The definition of "franchise fee" is also intended to narrow the appli-
cation of the disclosure bill. To qualify under the definition of "fran-
chise" there must be a fee paid, directly or indirectly, to the franchisor."'
Franchise fees are defined as an amount required to be paid to secure the
right to enter business under the franchise agreement, with three excep-
tions:
(1) the purchase or agreement to purchase goods at a bona fide whole-
sale price;
(2) the payment of a reasonable service charge to the issuer of a credit
49 ld,
50 One commentator defines a franchise as:
[A) contractually integrated system of marketing and distribution of a product, de.
fined as goods, services, or a way of doing business ... whereby a franchisor who has
developed a successful, accepted product and business format for his type of busi.
ness, then contracts with independent, relatively similar busine-s men (franchisees),
giving them, for a fee, the right and license to sell this product, and subsequently
assisting them in selling this product to the public . . . the franchisor should, and
usually does, train the franchisee in the . . . operation of the business, and main.
tains and agrees to maintain continuing interest and assistance.
FELS, FRANCHISING: LEGAL PROBLEMS AND THE BUSINESS FRAMEWORK OF R13PFRENCEI
-AN OvER IEw 9, 10 (J. McCord & 1. Cohen, Eds. 1968).
51 S.B. 295 § 17d5.o1(D). This definition is identical to the California provision. CAL.
CORP. CODE § 31005 (West Supp. 1971).
5 2 S.B. 295 § 1705.01(D).
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card by an establishment accepting or honoring such credit cards;
and
(3) amounts paid to a trading stamp company by a person issuing trad-
ing stamps in connection with the retail sale of merchandize or
service.53
This definition of "franchise fee" effectively prevents the application of
S.B. 295 to the typical distributor-retailer arrangements, regardless of
whether the parties use the term "franchise" in their agreement, because the
agreement typically provides only for the purchase of goods at a true
wholesale price. There will no doubt be cases where the franchisor at-
tempts to avoid the reach of the disclosure bill by foregoing any formal
franchise fee. If the franchisor obtains revenue from the franchisee in the
form of inflated prices for goods in exchange for the franchise license, the
franchisor should be subject to S.B. 295, since, in effect, he has received a
payment for the right to enter business under the franchisor's plan. The
exception for the purchase of goods at a bona fide wholesale price would
not exempt the franchisor in such a case from the disclosure provisions,
but the enforcement of this provision will be difficult. Franchisor schemes
to avoid this section of S.B. 295 should be considered in substance rather
than form. Only in this way could the proper meaning and purpose of
the statute be effected.
The exemption provisions of S.B. 295 further narrow the application
of the proposal. First, the Division of Securities may declare a franchise
exempt if the Division finds that the registration is not necessary to pro-
tect the investor-franchisee.5 4  What is intended by this exemption is not
entirely clear. It could be viewed as a "safety valve" to provide a means
for declaring exemptions of new marketing systems which may literally
fall within the jurisdiction of the statute, but may not be of a type which
the Division believes should be regulated. This discretionary exemption
power should be used sparingly, since the statute itself established certain
exemptions deemed desirable by the legislature.' 5
Franchisors which meet minimum financial requirements"' are exempt
from registration, but not disclosure, if they also have at least 25 fran-
chisees prior to the offer of sale 7 and disclose the specified information. s
5a S.B. 295 § 1705.01(E).
5 4 SM. 295 § 1705.05 (C). The burden of proving an exemption in any proceeding bared
on the Ohio franchise disclosure law is on the person claiming it S.B. 295 § 1705.36. An
alternative is to require the person seeking an exemption to present evidence in support there-
of prior to selling within the state.
55 The Division of Securities would presumably consult the legislature if major exemptions
were to be proposed by administrative rule.
56S.B. 295 § 1705.04(A). The franchisor must have a net worth of at least $5,000,000
to be exempt. If the franchisor is owned by a corporation having a net worth of at least
$5,000,000, then the franchisor must have a minimum net worth of $1,000,000 to be exempt.
5- S.B. 295 § 1705.04(B). The parent or subsidiary franchisor must have at least 25 fran-
chisees which have conducted business for at least five years preceding the offer of sale.
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The exemptions are based on the belief that established franchisors will
have available assets if the franchise goes sour, and will also have the
needed expertise to aid the franchisee in the initial establishment of the
business. S.B. 295 also specifically exempts any bank credit card plans if a
regulated bank carries the accounts"9 and any sale by a franchisee for his
own account.60
The exemption provisions differ from those proposed in Massachu-
setts bill entitled the "Franchise Fair Dealing Act." 0' This proposal does
not exempt the large, well-established franchisors. The Massachusetts
bill would exempt franchises where the franchisee derives less than twenty
percent of his gross sales from the franchise business if such sales are less
than $25,000.2 The Ohio proposal is preferable if the reason to require
registration is to protect the franchisee's investment in the form of the
franchise fee. The Massachusetts proposal allows the franchisor to avoid
registration where the franchisee's business is not significantly tied to the
franchised product. Where the relative volume of sales produced from
the franchise product is small or the franchise term is brief, the Massachu-
sett's bill does not require registration. This is obviously designed to ex-
empt the manufacturer who "franchises" many deaders who, in turn, sell
many products in retail outlets. S.B. 295 could arguably be construed in
the same manner where the sales volume from the franchised product is
small, depending upon the interpretation of "business" as this term is used
in the bill. At what point the franchisee's sales volume in the licensed
product becomes his "business" is a question which remains unanswered.
If the true purpose of franchise disclosure is to protect the unsophisticated,
small franchisee, the bill should not exempt any franchisor offering a fran-
chise to a potential franchisee-investor with a net worth of less than a set
value.
The jurisdictional requirements of any proposed statute must be de-
signed to insure the application intended. A close examination of the def-
initions and exemptions relating to the Ohio francbise disclosure proposal
must be undertaken by the legislature. Although future litigation on the
jurisdictional requirements of S.B. 295 cannot be averted, every effort
should be made to limit the application of the statute to the intended class
of franchisors. Perhaps this problem is more acute in Ohio legislation
since the litigant rarely has access to legislative history. The franchisors
and the Ohio Division of Securities, however, should be provided with
58 S.B. 295 § 1705.04(C). Exempt franchisees qualifying under the financial exemption rules
must disclose in writing, at least 48 hours prior to execution of the franchise contract, certain
basic facts as outlined in S.B. 295 §§ 1705.04(C) (1)-(14).
59 S.B. 295 § 1705.05(A).
60 S.B. 295 § 1705.04(B).
6 1 Mass. S. 110 (1971).
02 Id. § 2.
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the best possible guidelines so that the statute can be administered and en-
forced fairly.
C. Disclosure Provisions
In the absence of a specific exemption, it is made unlawful under S.B.
295 to offer or sell a franchise unless registered with the Division of Se-
curities.! The registration application must include specified information
concerning the franchisor's business.6 4 It must also be accompanied by the
proposed offering prospectus and any other disclosures the Division may
require.65 If the Division does not issue a stop order, the registration be-
comes effective after fifteen days.66 The Division may issue a stop order
in the three following situations:
(1) if there has been a failure to comply with the statute or any Divi-
sion rule adopted pursuant to the statute; or
(2) if the offer or sale would constitute misrepresentation, fraud or de-
ceit with respect to the purchaser; or,
(3) if any person identified in the application has been the subject of
criminal prosecution, any agency action, or civil judgment, and the
involvement of such person in the sale or management of the
franchise creates an unreasonable risk to prospective franchisees.GT
The Division of Securities does not make a determination that the proposal
is fair to the prospective franchisee. The disclosure requirements are de-
signed to give the prospective franchisee the opportunity to determine the
fairness of the offer. The Division's authority is only to protect the pro-
spective buyer from misrepresentation or fraud which makes this provision
consistent with the policy of the Ohio securities laws.68 In addition, the pro-
spectus must recite that registration does not constitute the Divisions ap-
proval or recommendation.6 9
The disclosure bill also gives the Division of Securities two practical
means of protecting the prospective franchisee. Advertisements published
in Ohio offering a franchise for sale must be filed with the Division for its
review prior to publication.70 The Division then is given the discretion to
order that the franchise fee be escrowed or a surety bond furnished by the
franchisor, if it is found that the applicant has failed to show adequate
63 S.B. 295 § 1705.03.
64id. § 1705.06.
651d. § 1705.07.
661d. § 1705.12.
671d. § 1705.11.
68 Omo Rnv. CODE ANN. §§ 1707.25-26 (Page 1964).
69 S.B. 295 § 1705.07.
7oid. at § 1705.14. The Division will review the advertisement and, if found to be mis-
leading, will notify the advertiser. S.B. 295 § 1705.15. If the advertiser violates the order
by publishing the Division may seek an injunction. S.B. 295 § 1705.21.
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financial ability to fulfill his promises to provide land, equipment, or train-
ing to the franchisee.7'
The disclosure requirements," the heart of the proposal, are quite in-
clusive and are set out in Appendix A. Several of the requirements de-
serve discussion or explanation. Subdivision (I) requires (1) a statement
of the franchise fee, (2) the proposed allocation of the proceeds and (3)
the formula used to determine the fee if variations exist among franchisees.
This requirement is designed to give the prospective franchisee informa-
tion to determine what tangible benefits he will receive in the form of
equipment, training, advertising and other promised consideration. The
largest part of the fee generally is allocated to the intangible benefits,
i.e. the right to do business under the franchisor's name.73 If the franchisee
is aware of the percentage of the fee designated "profit," he may have the
opportunity to bargain over the amount of the fee. Disclosure is also nec-
essary to allow the Division of Securities to determine if the fee should be
escrowed for the buyer's protection.74
Subdivision (J) requires disclosure of any other fees, including royal-
ties, which the franchisee must pay. This requirement should be inter-
preted as requiring disclosure of charges for rent, equipment, advertising
and supplies. Franchisors have often charged exorbitant prices for sup-
plies,"5 and this provision will put the prospective franchisee on notice of
the approximate costs of operating the business.
Subdivision (K) requires disclosure of conditions upon which the
franchisor may terminate, refuse to renew or repurchase a franchise con-
tract. In the absence of a statute regulating termnations, the franchisor
has often been permitted to terminate the franchise without cause subject
71 Id. § 1705.10. A New York proposal suggested that all fecs paid by the franchisee were
to be held in trust until actually used to establish the franchise. New York SB. 2321. An-
other proposal would require a mandatory $5,000 bond to be filed with a state agency. Minn.
S.B. 1595.
72 S.B. 295 § 1705.06.
73 See E. LEWIS & R. HANcocK, THE FRANCHISE SYSTEM OF DIsTnuBUTIoN 21, 28.31
(Univ. of Minnesota 1963), reprinted in Hearings on S. Res. 40 Beore the Sabcomm. on
Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
[hereinafter cited as LEWIS & HANCOcK].
74 S.B. 295 § 1705.10.
75 BROWN, supra note 9, at 15-16. See Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43
(9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972). In Siegel, franchisees sought treble
damages for excessive charges for equipment and supplies they were required to buy under
the franchise agreement. The Ninth Circuit held that the contract constituted an illegal tying
arrangment in violation of the Sherman Act. The case was remanded to determine certain
factual issues relating to damages. The federal district court had previously granted relief to
the plaintiff franchisees. Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
Another problem area has been discrimination between franchisees with respect to the
amounts charged for equipment, supplies and royalty payments. At least two proposals
have contained clauses dealing with such discriminations. See Washington S.B. 755 § 18(1)(C)
(1971) and Arkansas Act No. 252 § 2 (1971). The Arkansas enactment simply prohibits
royalty fees charged Arkansas franchisees from exceeding royalties charged franchisees in
other states.
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only to liability for antitrust violations.-- It should be noted that S.B.
295 does not attempt to regulate the termination in any manner since the
disclosure bill is directed only at the initial sale of the franchise.
Subdivision (L) requires disclosure of whether the contract requires
the franchisee to buy supplies or equipment from the franchisor organiza-
tion. Product purchase agreements, required by the franchisor as a con-
dition precedent to the sale of the franchise license, are extremely vulner-
able to antitrust attacks as illegal tying arrangements under the Sherman
Act.77 Although S.B. 295 does not purport to influence developing anti-
trust law, subdivision (L) will alert the prospective franchisee to the fran-
chisor's policy regarding the purchasing of commissary supplies and neces-
sary equipment. Two recent cases provide the franchisee with an idea
of what kind of tying arrangements will be permitted within the antitrust
laws. In Susser v. Carvel Corp.,s the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld a tying arrangement where franchisees were required to purchase
ice cream mix from the franchisor. The Susser court accepted the follow-
ing franchisor justifications for the tie-in purchase requirements: control
of product quality, maintenance of a secret ice cream formula, and possible
tort liability of the franchisor for harmful ingredients. The courts may
also accept the justification that the franchisor is relatively new in the busi-
ness and that alternate suppliers are not available."2 A more recent deci-
76 See text accompanying notes 103-58 infra.
7 7 Tying arrangements are vulnerable to attack under § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1 (1964), § 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964), and under § 5 of the FTC Act, 15
U.S.C. § 45 (1964). Earlier cases seem to adopt a per se approach to tying arrangements.
Today, howver, the possibility of establishing a justification, appears to relax the per -e approach,
if not abrogate it entirely. In International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947), Mr.
Justice Jackson stated in his majority opinion that "it is unreasonable, pcr se, (ici] to foreclose
competitors from any substantial market." Id. at 396. Eleven years later the Court qualified
the strict per se approach. Writing for the majority in Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States,
356 U.S. 16 (1958), Mr. Justice Black found tying arrangements to be
unreasonable in and of themselves whenever a party has sufficient economic power
with respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free competition in the
market for the tied product and a "not insubstantial" amount of interstate commerce
is affected.
In 1963, Mr. Justice Douglas observed in his majority opinion that tying arrangements "may
fall" in the category of per se violation, "though not necessarily so." White Motor Co. v.
United States, 372 U.S. 253, 262 (1963). White Motor was primarily a territorial restriction
case; the principle involved, however, is dearly analagous. For a discussion of the antitrust
implications of franchise tying devices, see McCarthy, Trademark Franchising and Antitrust.
The Trouble with Tie-ins, 58 CALIF. L REV. 1085 (1970); Rudnick, The Franchisore's Dilemma:
Can He Satisfy the Legal and Commercial Requirements of a Trademark Licensing System
Without Exposing Himself to Other Legal Risks, 56 TRmDEMARK REPTi. 621 (1966); Turner,
The Validity of T~ing Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laus, 72 HARV. L. Rrv. 50 (1958);
Note, Business Justification for Tying Agreements: A Retreat from the Per Se Doctrine, 17
W. RES I. REv. 257 (1965).
78 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed as improridently granted, 381 U.S. 125
(1965).
79 See United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), af'd
per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961). See also Note, Newcomer Defenses: Reasonable Use of Tie-
Ins, Franchises, Territorials, and Exclusives, 18 STAN. L. REv. 457 (1966).
1972]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
sion, however, suggests that franchisors may now face a heavier burden in
justifying tying arrangements. In Siegel v. Chicken Delight, lnc.,,8° the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to condone a tying arrangement
requiring fast-food franchisees to purchase a specified number of fryers,
cookers, packaging supplies, and mixes. The Siegel decision relied upon
a United States Supreme Court decision for the test to be applied to deter-
mine the legality of tying the purchase of supplies to the franchise license.
[T~he protection of the good will of the manufacturer of the tying device
-fails in the usual situation because specification of the type and quality
of the product to be used in connection with the tying device is protec-
tion enough .... The only situation, indeed, in wh'ch the protection of
good will may necessitate the use of tying clauses is where specifications
for a substitute would be so detailed that they could not practicably be
supplied.8 '
The jury in Siegel found that effective quality control was possible by
specification for the cooking equipment and the spice mixes. The court
determined as a matter of law that specification of the packaging materials
was possible after the defendant decided not to contest this issue. Thus,
the designation of alternate suppliers in the usual case will fulfill the
franchisor's legitimate desire to maintain a uniform quality.2 Only in lim-
ited circumstances should the courts allow the franchisor to justify schemes
which tie products furnished by the franchisor organization to the fran-
chise license or trademark.
Subdivision (P) requires disclosure of any projected franchisee earnings
reports and data supporting these estimates. Advertisements offering fran-
chises for sale are often misleading on this point.8 3 It is obvious that new
franchise locations may not produce the same profit figures as an established
franchise in a prime location. 4 The data furnished by the franchisor
80448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972). Two distinct prod-
ucts are necessary for a tying arrangement. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States,
345 U.S. 594, 613-614 (1953). The two distinct products in the typical franchise system
are the franchise trademark and the operational supplies. Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc.,
supra notes 47-48.
81 Standard Oil of Calif. and Standard Stations, Inc. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306
(1949).
82 It is submitted that the result in Susser is the exception to the rule expressed in Standard
Oil of Calif. The recent Siegel decision raises serious doubts as to whether franchisors can
place much reliance upon the Susser opinion. See Note, Tying Arrangements Under the
Antitrust Laws: The "Integrity of the Product" Defense, 62 MIcH. L. REv. 1413 (1964); Com-
ment, Franchises, Requirements Contracts and Tie-ins: One Test fo'r a Tangled Two, 74 YALU
.. 691 (1965).
8 3 N.Y. Att'y Gen. Rep., supra note 9, at 9-10. Contra LEwIS & HANCOCX, supra note 73,
at 81: "Only a few franchisees felt that they had been 'oversold' on the business by a glowing
profit picture painted by the franchisor."
84 See Interim Hearing, supra note 9, at 130. The California Department of Corpora-
dons has exercised its authority to issue rules under CAL. CORP. CODE § 31502 (West Supp.
1971). The rule relating to franchisee earnings projections simply states:
Where projected or estimated franchisee earnings are proposed to be used such
projected or estimated earnings together with a statement setting forth the data
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should be reported in a mode offering a meaningful breakdown of profit
projections for reasonable classifications of franchisees. Classifications
could be prescribed by the Division of Securities based upon location, size
and length of operation. The aim should be to provide the prospective
franchisee with realistic data without guaranteeing any level of sales or
earnings. Aggregating the performances of individual franchisees, even
-assuming that reasonable classifications are devised, will never be a totally
accurate guide to the prospective buyer. What can be accomplished under
a system of reasonable classifications is to foreclose the possibility that
the franchisor will make earnings projections completely devoid of factual
support.
Subdivision (S) pertains to disclosure of exclusive territory agreements.
The franchisee does not want to compete directly with other franchisees
or the franchisor's self-owned units. The limiting factors here are the
antitrust laws which may require the franchisor to show justification for
territorial restraints.8 The disclosure provision of this subdivision is mere-
ly intended to put the prospective franchisee on notice of the franchisors
policy of granting or not granting territorial rights. The disclosure will
serve as evidence of the franchisor's representation to the franchisee if
later disputes concerning territorial rights arise.
D. Remedies Available to the Franchisee
In addition to possible criminal liability,8 S.B. 295 creates a civil rem-
edy for the injured franchisee or prospective franchisee for certain enumer-
ated unlawful acts. This gives the franchisee a cause of action for dam-
ages and, if the violation is willful, recission may be granted., The
prohibited practices are five in number:
(1) willfully making an untrue statement or omitting a required state-
ment of a material fact in any application or report;
(2) selling a franchise in Ohio by means of any misleading statement
or omission outside the application or prospectus;
(3) violating any order of the Division of Securities;
(4) making any representation that the Division of Securities has ea-
dorsed the offer; and
(5) in the case of exempt franchisors, willfully making or omitting
any material fact as required to be disclosed under § 1705.04.88
upon which such estimation or projection is based should be included in the offer-
ing prospectus, to the extent the projections are generally applicable to all franchisees.
RELATED RULES OF FRANcI sE INVESmiENT LAW § 310.114.2(16) (1971). Whether this
rule will be effective in forcing the franchisors to offer meaningful data remains to be seen.
85 See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); United States v.
Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
One proposed disclosure law prohibits the franchisor from competing in the relevant market
area with its own franchisees. Washington S.B. 755 § 755.18 (1)(f) (1971).
86 S.B. 295 § 1705.99.
87 S3. 295 § 1705.22.
88
.B3. 295 § 1705.16. The exempt franchisor must still disclose certain facts to the fran-
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The principal remedy for franchisees for deceptive practices traditionally
has been an action for fraud. 9 S.B. 295 seems to parallel the fraud rem-
edy although it may be easier for the franchisee to prevail in cases of will-
ful omissions. A recovery of attorney fees should be considered as an ad-
ditional aid to the defrauded franchisee.9"
The franchisor is also liable in damages to the franchisee for failure to
file an application for registration or failure to disclose any statement spe-
cifically required by S.B. 295. Willful failure to comply will also allow
the franchisee to sue for rescission." Many franchisors may be judgment
proof when the franchisee sues for damages.2 S.B. 295 gives the plain-
tiff an extended range of defendants from which to collect by imposing
joint and several liability on partners, officers, or directors of the fran-
chisor.93 This provision is in line with the purpose of providing the
"duped" franchisee with restitution of his investment.
IV. SUBSTANTIVE LEGISLATION BEYOND DISCLOSURE
Disclosure legislation is designed to correct abuses at the entry point.
After the franchise agreement is executed, different types of abuses and
problems arise. The franchisee, of course, is put on notice by the disclosure
'that the franchisor may plan to follow certain policies, but the franchisor
may ignore his previous representations. Nor is the fairness of the fran-
chisor's policies determined by disclosure. As a result, two major problem
areas can be discerned: (1) termination of the franchise relationship,
and (2) the superior bargaining position of the franchisor. The termina-
tion situation has received considerable legislative attention; unlike the
inequalities of bargaining power which have been shown most clearly in
antitrust suits. The legislative response to the unfair bargaining position
has come in the form of proposals for collective bargaining or arbitration.
chisee, and disclosure must be made at least 48 hours prior to execution of the franchise contract.
S.B. 295 § 1705.34.
89 BROWN, sapra note 9, at 35-38. See, e.g., Hartong v. Partake, Inc., 266 Cal. App. 2d 942,
72 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1968).
90 See Oregon H.B. 1497 § 5 (1971), which allows the recovery of attorney fees.
91 S.B. 295 § 1705.22. The franchisor may have a defense under this section if he proves
that the franchisee knew of the untruth or omission. The franchisor may also assert as a
defense that he did not know of the untruth and would not have known if he had exercised rea-
sonable care.
92 The statute of limitations for actions based on failure to file registration or to disclose
required information is: (a) four years, or (b) one year after dis(overy by the plaintiff, or
(c) ninety days after written notice of a violation given by the franchisor to the franchisee,
whichever occurs first. S.B. 295 § 1705.22. For actions grounded on misleading state.
ments outside the registration area, the statute of limitations substitutes a two year maximum
but is otherwise identical. S.B. 295 § 1705.23.
03 S.B. 295 § 1705.24.
(Vol. 33
FRANCHISE SYMPOSIUM
A. Legislation Affecting Bargaining Position
The Massachusetts "Franchise Fair Dealing Act," introduced in 197 1,,t
contains two provisions to help equalize the bargaining position. One sec-
tion allows franchisees to associate for collective bargaining purposes:
Franchisees shall have the right to select a collective bargaining agent of
their own choosing to negotiate and deal with franchisors and subfran-
chisors on matters having to do with their franchise relationship.13
Under this proposal the franchisor is obligated to bargain with the selected
agent." Arbitration is the alternative method of equalizing the disparity
in bargaining position under the Massachusetts proposal, and the parties
are permitted to provide compulsory binding arbitration clauses in the
franchise contract.9 7
The collective bargaining provision would give the franchisees, as a
class, power to bargain in many crucial areas. The pricing of necessary
supplies and equipment is the most obvious and perhaps the most impor-
tant for the franchisees, but a wide range of franchisor practices and pol-
icies would be subject to the bargaining s8 Th ecollective bargaining pro-
vision is a realistic alternative for settling disputes as opposed to the class
action suit which may destroy the franchisor organization financially. The
class action would also consume a great amount of time before a remedy
is available; both sides may be financially destroyed before the court order
is final.
However, there are two major drawbacks to the collective bargaining
approach. First, it may be unlawful under the antitrust laws. The federal
antitrust laws specifically exempt labor collective bargaining from their
application," and without such an exemption the bargaining arrangement
may be construed as an illegal group boycott. 00 The second drawback is
that collective bargaining may disrupt the franchise relationship. Ideally,
the franchise arrangement is a joint business venture, since both parties
must rely on each other for ultimate success of the enterprise. In recogni-
tion of the defects of collective bargaining, one legislative proposal would
establish a "mutual fiduciary obligation" between the franchise parties
based upon agency concepts.', This approach has basic shortcomings be-
cause of the very nature of a fiduciary duty. The essence of a fiduciary
9 4 Mfass. S. 110 (1971).
95 Id. § 6(b).
96Id. § 6(c).
97Id. § 7(c).
9 8 See BROWN, supra note 9, at 92-93.
99 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1964).
10 0 See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
01 Texas H.B. 709 (1971). This bill is termed the Texas Franchise Assoction Act. A
similar provision was included in the Texas Franchise Investment Act, -B. ,i05 § 9(17),
62d Legis., Reg. Sess., 1971.
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relationship is that the fiduciary is to prefer another party's interests to his
own private interests. The franchisee and franchisor are dealing at arms
length and have assumed their respective positions as a result of contract
negotiation. If one considers the franchise fee an investment, then it is
conceivable to impose a fiduciary duty on the franchisor just as the law
places a fiduciary duty on the director of a corporation. To develop a ba-
sis for imposing a fiduciary standard on the franchisee, however, is not so
simple. If mutual obligations were imposed, the result may be a situa-
tion where two parties are striving to prefer the other's interests over their
own, with the final result that both parties suffer.
Compulsory arbitration may prove to be a satisfr.ctory method of solv-
ing contract disputes so long as the method of arbitration is fair. The
Massachusetts arbitration provision would not foreclose the franchisee's
right to bring suit based upon violations of the Act.10 2  Thus, disputes
over prices and business policies could be arbitrated, while the franchisor
would still subject to suit based upon violations of statutory duties. The
arbitration would only operate within the bonds of the contract itself.
The drawback is that the individual franchisee cannot afford the same legal
or financial experts that the franchisor has available for arbitration. The
franchisee needs a system which provides arbitration assistance to a col-
lective group of franchisees with similar problems.
The problems encountered by the franchisee during the contract term
are substantial enough to warrant legislative protection. Each state legis-
lature should closely consider the alternatives available or design new
methods to solve the problems created by the disparate powers of the
parties.
B. Protection from unjust termination
The franchise termination clause, an almost universally included pro-
vision in the franchise contract, is a constant threat to the franchisee.
The most common termination clause provides that the franchisor may
cancel for any failure by the franchisee to comply with the franchisor's
standard procedures of operation.103 Some contracts provide for termina-
tion at the will of the franchisor.04  The franchisor can easily include
many detailed operation procedures in the contract which may be virtually
10 2 The Massachusetts provision provides:
With regard to disputes which arise after commencement of a franchise, the parties
may provide for compulsory arbitration with the decision to be final and binding
provided that the manner of selecting arbitrators, the time and place of arbitration,
the sharing of expenses of arbitration, and the procedures are fair and reasonable
and provided further, that in such arbitration proceedings, the franchisee shall
be entitled to the same procedural and substantive rights as those set forth in this
Act ....
Mass. S. 110 § 7(c) (1971).
303 BROWN, supra note 9, at 26-27.
104 Interim Hearing, supra note 9, at 176 (testimony of Harold Brown).
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impossible to comply with. Such clauses make many franchise contracts
terminable at will for all practical purposes. Franchisees may be forced
to give up a considerable degree of control over their investments in an at-
tempt to comply with the franchisor's strict requirements. Absent statu-
tory regulation, the courts have generally permitted the franchisor to ter-
minate unilaterally or to refuse renewal 0 : of the franchise if such action
was unrelated to antitrust violations.""0 The basis of such decisions has
often been the doctrine of freedom of contract; however, this common law
right to terminate, or to refuse to renew, the contract is being seriously
questioned in the area of franchising. 10 7
Dissatisfaction with the franchisee's operation or business practice has
been the strongest ground for termination and the courts have permitted
such action where the complaints were legitimate."" More flagrant termi-
nations, however, have also received judicial approval in the past. One
court permitted termination where the franchisor was acquired by a com-
pany which already had its own distribution channels, and, therefore, had
no need to maintain the existing franchisee operations. 00 In yet another
termination case, the court held that termination of a franchise was
proper where the franchisor had decided to grant an exclusive territory to
another franchisee in the same geographical area."0 Even where there is
a justification for the termination, a proper concern of the court should
be to insure that the franchisee receives a fair value for his investment.
Where the termination itself is not contested by the franchisee, an equi-
table payment for any assets exchanged (including goodwill contributed by
the franchisee) and just compensation for any rights forfeited by the
franchisee should be required. Unfortunately, this is often not the case."'
105 Most franchises are granted for a specified time period and are subject to renewaL
Lwss & HANCOCK, supra note 73, at 60-62. Sco Bushwick-Decatur Motors v. Ford Motor
Co., 116 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1940), holding that an automobile dealership contract which
could be terminated by either party at will gave the manufacturer the unqualified power to
terminate the contract regardless of good faith. The automobile dealers have since received
legislative protection to prevent such action by the manufacturers. Sce text accompanying notes
117-22 infra.
106United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). The franchisor was permitted
to terminate out of "sheer perversity" in Lowe's, Inc. v. Somerville Drive-In Theatr Corp.,
148 A.2d 599 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div., 1959).
'
0 7 See Gellhorn, Limitations on Contractual Termination Rights-&Frncbio Ca '-cella-
tions, 1967 DuKE LJ. 465.
10 8 Interborough News Co. v. Curtis Publishing Co., 255 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1955); Hud-
son Sales Corp. v. Waldrip, 211 F.2d 268 (5th Cir.), ccrt. dcnicd, 348 U.S. 821 (1954).
109 Bender v. Hearst Corp., 152 F. Supp. 569 (D. Conn. 1957), at'd, 263 F.2d 360 (2d Cir.
1959).
11o Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 FP2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957); Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp., 133 F. Supp.
899 (D. Md. 1956), a#'d per curiam, 239 F.2d 176 (4th Cr. 1956), crt. d-cried, 355 U.S.
823 (1957).
Ill Industrial Buildings Materials, Inc. v. InterChemical Corp., 437 F.2d 1336 (9th Cr.
1970); Ace Beer Distributors Co. v. Kohn, Inc., 318 F.2d 283 (6th Cir. 1963). The testi-
1972]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
With little or no burden on the franchisor to show proper cause for a
franchise termination, the franchisee has been left with the possibility of
contesting the termination with antitrust theories. Thus, if the franchisee
can prove that the termination or refusal to renew the franchise resulted
from the franchisor's efforts to establish or maintain a monopoly,112 or
from an illegal conspiracy among several franchisors or among the fran-
chisor and other franchisees,113 the franchisee may recover treble dam-
ages in an antitrust action. A similar result would follow if the franchisee
can establish that cancellation resulted from the franchisor's efforts to il-
legally maintain resale prices,114 to effect or maintain tying arrangements,11 6
or to prevent the franchisees from selling competing products or ser-
vices.116 The obvious shortcoming of the antitrust remedy is that the fran-
chisee cannot afford the long and expensive antitrust litigation. Although
the franchisee may use prior court determinations resulting from govern-
ment prosecutions as res judicata, the franchise may not be a viable con-
cern by the time the franchisee has recovered damages.
The problem of unjust franchise terminations has received considera-
tion by legislators at the federal and state government levels. The
mony of a beer distributor as to the effect of the termination of his franchise illustrates the
problem:
At the time of the cancellation I operated as two closed corporations, one owning
real estate and motorized equipment, the other owning the inventory and related mer-
chandizing equipment. In 1946 I started out with capital amounting to $10,000.
At the time of cancellation the real estate corporation had a net worth of $200,000,
and the distributing company one of $185,000. Over the last 10-year period of
operation the net profits of the two corporations, plus the salaries I drew from them,
averaged over $100,000 annually-that was before Federal taxes. With the can-
cellation I lost the right to sell a going business for a price which such earnings
would [have) justified. Not only did I forfeit future earnings .nd good will value of
the business, but I had also to accept a fire-sale valuation for real estate and equip.
ment. Having single-purpose warehouses and equipment, I had no alternative but
to accept. Otherwise, I would have been left with nothing more than two piles of
brick mortar and a -junk" yard of motorized equipment.
Hearings on Distribution Problems Affecting Small Business Before The Subcomm. on Anti.
trust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 526, 527
(1965).
112 Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); Eastman Kodak Co. v. South-
ern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927); National Screen Service Corp. v. Poster
Exchange, Inc., 305 F.2d 647 (5th Cir. 1962).
113 Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961); Klor's,
Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
114 Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); United State. v. General Motors Corp,,
384 U.S. 127 (1966); United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); Brous-
sard v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 350 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1965); George W. Warner & Co. v.
Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1960).
115 Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed as improvidently
granted, 381 U.S. 125 (1965); Dehydrating Process Co. v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d
653 (1st Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961); Englander Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor
Co., 267 F.2d 11 (6th Cit. 1959).
116 Federal Trade Comm'n v. Brown Shoe Co., Inc., 384 U.S. 316 (1966); Standard Oil
Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949). See also Tampa Electric Co. v.
Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961); Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200
F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953).
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first legislation enacted was the Automobile Dealer Franchise Act.- "
This Act simply gives the automobile dealer the right to institute suit in
a federal district court to recover damages and attorney fees if the auto-
mobile manufacturer did not "act in good faith in performing or comply-
ing with any of the terms or provisions of the franchise, or in terminating,
cancelling, or not renewing the franchise .. "18 The burden of estab-
lishing a lack of "good faith" is placed on the dealer-franchisee."' Be-
cause of the difficulty of proving bad faith, 20 the automobile dealers have
not been very successful in suits under this act.'' The act also fails to
provide the dealer with a recovery for "goodwill" which may exist at ter-
mination. 22
The New York state legislature attempted to strengthen the automo-
bile dealer's situation by replacing the "good faith" testea of the Automo-
bile Dealer's Franchise Act with a test of "good cause,"'2- thereby placing a
greater burden on the manufacturer. The proposed bill also provided for
a mandatory injunction to prevent termination of the dealer franchise dur-
ing litigation.12 This injunction provision is crucial to the dealer. With-
out an injunction to prevent termination, the dealership is placed in jeop-
ardy of failing before the litigation ends. This proposal, however, was
vetoed by the Governor of New York.2 Most states have not enacted
legislation in this area, probably because they have believed the federal
legislation 2 7 to be sufficient to protect the interests of the automobile deal-
ers.
The most discussed proposal to regulate franchise termination in re-
cent years was the Fairness in Franchising Act 2 introduced in 1969, by
117 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (1970).
118 15 US.C. § 1222 (1970).
11" Milos v. Ford Motor Co., 317 F.2d 712, 718 (3d Cir. 1963).
1 20 The courts have required a showing of coercion or intimidation on the part of the man-
ufacturer. See Woodward v. General Motors Corp., 298 F.2d 121, 128 (5th Cir.), cert. denicd,
369 U.S. 887 (1962); H.R. REP. No. 2850,84th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1956).
121 BROWN, supra note 9, at 81. In the first 91 cases under the Act, only one franchisee
award was upheld on appeal.
122 Pierce Ford Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 299 F.2d 425 (2d Cir. 1962).
12 15 U.S.C. § 1222 (1964).
124 New York S.B. 4915 § 2 (1969).
125 Id. § 3.
12 COTqINENTALTRANCHISE REV., July 28,1969, at 7.
127 15 U.S.C. § 1221-25 (1970).
128 S. 1967, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) . The Hart Bill was not the first congressional
attempt to aid the franchisee in his fight against termination by the franchisor. See HR.
13628, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 12490, 91st Cong., 1st Seas. (1969); H-R. 2818,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); H.R. 11972, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); M.R. 10113, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). The Hart Bill was first introduced as S. 2321, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967), and was later redrafted and introduced as S. 1967 after Congressional hearings. Hear-
ings on Economic Concentration Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). The original Hart Bill pro-
vided that the terminated franchisee could sue for damages if the franchisor did not pay the
1972]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Senator Hart. Unlike the previous federal legislation,12 the Hart Bill was
not limited to the automobile industry. More importantly, the Hart Bill
placed the burden of proof on the franchisor to establish that the cancel-
lation was for good cause.130 Under the earlier Automobile Dealer Act,
the franchisee has to establish "bad faith" on the part of the manufac-
turer and "bad faith" was interpreted as meaning "coercion or intimida-
tion."' 3' Thus the defendant franchisor would have a greater burden to
meet under the Hart Bill.
Unlike the proposed New York bill," 2 the Hart Bill did not provide
for a mandatory injunction to foreclose immediate termination of the fran-
chise. Federal courts, however, will issue injunctions where the fran-
chisee shows that he may possibly prevail over the franchisor at trial.'13
A mandatory injunction seems to be the better solution. The franchisee
must be given time to use discovery in order to show cause to the federal
court to issue an injunction pending the conclusion of the ligitation. The
Hart Bill also provided that the franchisor give at least ninety days ad-
vance notice of termination. Although this provision has been criticized
as unworkable'34 and of no aid to either party,'-3 it would give the fran-
chisee time to institute his suit and to start discovery to develop facts to
warrant an injunction to prevent termination after the ninety day waiting
period ends. It also gives the franchisee some time, although inadequate,
to wind up his affairs by collecting receivables and depleting existing in-
ventories.
Although the main thrust of the Hart Bill was to protect the franchisee
from unfair terminations, the Act also prohibited a franchisor, in relation
to the franchisee, from engaging in any acts of unfair competition as de-
fined by § 5 of the FTC Act. 30 This provision broadens the scope of the
franchise regulation, but it is too vague as written. Section 5 of the FTC
franchisee a reasonable price for the franchise, including good will and any property involved,
The franchisee was also given a cause of action if the termination was not due to the fran-
chisee's "conscious malfeasance or willful failure . .. to perform adequately, competently
and in good faith the lawful duties imposed upon him by the franchise contract." S. 2321
90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
129 15 U.S.C. § 1221-25 (1970).
130 S. 1967, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1969). The Automobile Dealer Franchise Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1221-25 (1964), placed the burden on the franchisee to prove that the manufacturer had
not acted in good faith. Thus the Hart Bill was similar to the New York proposal discussed at
notes 124-25 supra.
'3' Milos v. Ford Motor Co., 317 F.2d 712, 718 (3d Cir. 1963).
1a 2 New York S.B. 4915 § 3 (1969).
'
3 3 Semmes Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197 (2d Cir. 1970); Swartz v.
Chrysler Motors Corp., 297 F. Supp. 834 (D.N.J. 1969). See also, Bergen Drug Co. v. Parke
Davis & Co., 307 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1962).
134 Letter from Paul Rand Dixon, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, to Senator
James 0. Eastland, Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, October 6, 1969.
13. Augustine & Hrusoff, Franchise Regulation, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 1347, 1369 (1970).
136 15 U.S.C. § 4 5(a) (1970).
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Act is itself designed to prevent unfair methods of competition, and this
section of the Hart Bill does not prosecute any conduct not already illegal.
Thus, unless it is meant to give the franchisee damages for any violation
of § 5, the Hart Bill merely superimposes another statute to make unfair
trade practices unlawful.
While the Hart Bill was in commitee, a federal court considered the
application of the Puerto Rican termination law.'3 7  In Fornaris v'. The
Ridge Tool Co., 38 the terminated franchisee attempted to avail himself
of the Puerto Rican statute which placed on the franchisor the burden
of justifying the cancellation. The franchise contract had been executed
prior to the enactment of the termination statute. The court held that re-
troactive application of the law was unconstitutional, but the issue of pro-
spective application of the law was reserved. Thus, it is quite possible
that termination legislation will not aid present franchisees.
Although the Hart Bill was not reported out of committee,' several
states have either enacted or considered similar legislation. Delaware en-
acted the first state law to protect franchisees against unjust termination.
The "Delaware Franchise Security Law,' ' 40 enacted in 1970, is not aimed
at a specific industry, but like the Hart Bill is of general application to
franchises. The Act applies to "franchise distributors" who are required
to invest more than $100 to enter the franchise agreement. 14' The defini-
tions provided in the Delaware law limit its application to the sale of prod-
ucts, thus excluding franchises offering services only. 42 The Delaware
Act provides for damages and injunctive relief similar to the remedies found
in the Hart Bill. Injunctive relief is available to the franchised distrib-
utor where the franchisor unjustly cancels, refuses to renew or threatens
termination .4 The statute leaves the determination of what is "unjust"
entirely to the courts. This Act seems designed to prevent threatened
terminations which can be used by a franchisor as a lever to coerce a fran-
chisee. Other provisions, requiring ninety days notice of termination and
placing the burden on the franchisor to justify cancellation, are identical to
those found in the Hart Bill.
The proposed Massachusetts "Franchise Fair Dealing Act"',4 is a com-
prehensive bill providing in part for protective measures against unfair
terminations. Section 5 specifically makes it unlawful to:
harass, intimidate, or coerce a franchisee to enter into any agreement or to
137 10 LP.R.A. §§ 278a-d (Equity Supp. 1971).
138 423 F.2d 563 (1st Cir. 1970).
13 9 CoNTNENTAL FRANcHnSE REv., June 1, 1970, at 2.
140 6 DELA. CODE ANN. §§ 2551-57 (West Supp. 1970).
1411d. § 2551.
142 Id.
1431d. § 2553.
144 Mass. S. 110 (1971).
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do or refrain from doing any other act prejudical to the franchisee or to
accomplish such result by threatening to cancel or to fail to renew any
franchise ...provided, however, that notice in good faith of the fran.
chisee's violation of any terms or conditions of such franchise or contrac-
tual agreement shall not constitute a violation hereof. 145
Section 5 also makes it unlawful to terminate a franchise without "due
cause" regardless of what the terms of the franchise contract provide.140
The franchisor must notify the franchisee and the Attorney General in
writing of termination sixty days prior to the effective date and must state
the grounds for this action. During the sixty day waiting period, either
party can petition the court for preliminary or final injunctive relief.
Thus, the Massachusetts proposal is substantively similar to the Hart Bill's
termination provisions.
A New Jersey enactment also attempts to solve the termination problem.
The "Franchise Practices Act"'147 contains a 180 day notice provision and
notice must be given regardless of the reason for termination or non-re-
newal of the franchise. 4 " "Good cause" is the franchisor's only defense
for the termination action. The Act provides that good cause is limited
to:
failure by the franchisee to substantially comply with those requirements
imposed upon him by the franchise which requirements must be essen-
tial, reasonable and nondiscriminatory.140
This section makes it dear that unreasonable franchisee requirements pro-
vided in -the contract, which may be impossible to fully comply with, will
not be given effect.
The Ohio General Assembly recently enacted legislation to regulate
the termination of automobile dealerships by manufacturers. Effective
November 18, 1971, an automobile manufacturer cannot terminate a dealer
franchise without the prior consent of the dealer for other than just
cause. " ' This law provides that the court shall determine what constitutes
"just cause" under the facts of the case. The court is not bound by the
terms of the contract in its determination. The franchisee may petition
the court for an injunction to prevent a threatened cancellation pending
a hearing to establish cause.151 Thus, the automobile dealer franchisee
will be able to remain in business until the court disposition. The manu-
facturer's liability for an unjust termination, or a cancelation without cause,
1451d. § 5(b)(1).
146Id. § 5(b)(2).
147 New Jersey Franchise Practices Act, N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 56:10-1-10-12 (West Supp.
1972).
4SId. § 10-5.
149 Id.
150 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1333.73 (Page Supp. 1971).
'1Id. § 1333.74.
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is limited to the reasonable damages proximately caused by the unlawful
action.'52 The statute also provides that the manufacturer shall purchase
the dealer's assets for their full market value; no provision is made, how-
ever, for reimbursement for loss of goodwill. Franchisees, other than
automobile dealers should be accorded at least the protection provided by
the existing Ohio law regulating the termination of automobile dealerships.
The termination threat, when combined with the fact that the franchisor
usually has a far superior economic position, may provide the basis for a
coercive relationship." 3 Without the aid of specific legislation protecting
the franchisee from unjust terminations, the franchisee may attempt to
contest the cancellation on the ground that the contract clause allowing
termination is unconscionable.2'5 The franchisee's argument should be
strenthened where the contract allows cancellation at will or for the viola-
tion of terms which are nearly impossible for any franchisee to comply
with in full. Using the Uniform Commercial Code by analogy, the fran-
chisee can present a strong case for enforcement of the franchise contract
without the unconscionable termination clause.115 Indeed, the Code sug-
gests that reasonable notification of termination should be the very least
the franchisee is entitled to." 6 Although advance notice may not be re-
quired in a situation where the termination is for just cause,157 it seems
equitable to grant the unjustly terminated franchisee a reasonable time
to adjust to the cancellation even if he does not contest the franchisor's
action.
The unconscionability argument, however, places a great burden on the
franchisee-plaintiff. Only under extreme circumstances are courts willing
to accept this argument as cause for altering written contracts.2' To en-
force the franchise contract and maintain the relationship, the court is
ordering specific performance of the agreement. Without legislative au-
thority granting the franchisee the right to seek specific performance of the
franchise contract, the courts will probably be reluctant to grant this extra-
ordinary remedy. Legislation similar to that now provided in Ohio to
protect the automobile dealers would give other franchisees the statutory
152 Id.
153 The FTC has prosecuted several cases involving the coercive use of economic Poawer.
See, e.g., FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968); Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S.
357 (1965); Shell Oil Co. v. FTC, 360 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1966).
15 4 See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Camp-
bell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948); American Home Improvement v. M-c
Iver, 105 N.H. 435,201 A.2d 886 (1964).
155 UNIFORM CoNMRCInAL CODE § 2-302(1) (1962 version) [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.].
1561d. § 2-309(3).
157 Id. § 2-309, Comment 9.
158 In one recent case the franchisee asserted that the failure to renew a franchise at the end
of a three year term without cause was unconscionable. The court disagreed and ruled in favor
of the franchisor. Division of Triple T Service, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 60 Iisc.2d 720, 304
N.Y.S.2d 191 (1969).
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basis to contest the termination and seek to have the franchise upheld.""
Franchisees relying directly on article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code
to protect their interest on termination will also face the burden of estab-
lishing that the Code applies. Although the sale of goods to the fran-
chisee would qualify for article 2 treatment, the sale of the franchise right
itself does not fit within 'the scope of the article. The comments to § 2-
105, however, state that the provisions of article 2 may be analagous to
the sale of investment securities. 6 ' Thus, the franchisee should be able
to avail himself of the general policies of the article dealing with the sale
of goods.' 6'
V. CONCLUSION
Ohio S.B. 295 is a sound legislative response to a major problem fac-
ing the franchising system. Although a franchise may resemble a security
in many ways, the abortive California attempt to utilize the state securities
laws to require disclosure by franchisors is strong evidence that specific
legislation is necessary to remedy the abuses in this area. The various
proposals considered by the state and federal legislatures are substantively
similar in respect to the items to be disclosed. The major differences in
'the statutes pertain to jurisdictional requirements and the enforcement and
administration. A complicating factor at this time is the possibility of a
federal act which preempts state legislation. Preemptive federal legisla-
tion, favored by the franchisors, has a great amount. of merit. The major
advantage to the franchisors is that they would be required to conform
to only one regulatory scheme. The franchisees would also be benefitted
by the enforcement expertise possessed by a federal administrative agency.
The FTC has taken a particularly active interest in franchise abuses.
State legislation, however, can have a significant place in the overall regu-
latory program to require disclosure by franchisors if preemptive federal
legislation is not enacted. For an effective scheme, however, the state leg-
islation should conform closely to the federal program to provide a co-
ordinated enforcement effort. For example, if the disclosure requirements
are nearly identical, the states could easily accept copies of registration
statements filed with the federal agency and thereby avoid unnecessary
duplication of effort. The availability of the concurrent jurisdiction of
state and federal agencies would provide an increased enforcement capa-
bility to the benefit of the franchisees. The federal agency may be better
prepared to cope with the larger interstate franchisors while leaving the
states to enforce disclosure by smaller intrastate franchisors. Considering
159 OO150 REv. CODE ANN. § 1333.73-74 (Page Supp. 1971).
160U.C.C. § 2-105, Comment 1.
01 See Comment, Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code and Franchise Dhir.
bution Agreements, 1969 DUKE LJ. 959. The author discusses in the detail the Possible
application of article 2 to the sale of franchise rights.
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'the fate of previous federal proposals to regulate franchising, the states
should not fail to enact adequate legislation to protect franchisees simply
because there exists a possibility of federal preemptive legislation.
There seems to be no basis for not providing Ohio franchisees the pro-
tection from unjust terminations which is presently accorded automobile
dealers. The threat of unjust terminations must be removed as the first
step toward providing the franchisee with the ability to bargain with the
franchisor on a more equal footing. The Ohio General Assembly should
also consider legislation which encourages binding arbitration between
franchisors and franchisee groups. Such legislation would provide the
franchisees with the ability to adequately protect their interests.
Curtis A. Loveland
APPENDIX A
Set forth below is § 1705.06 of Ohio Senate Bill 295. This section
-contains the complete list of items required to be disclosed by franchisors
under the proposed statute.
Sec. 1705.06. The application for registration of an offer shall be
filed with the Division of Securities and shall contain the following:
(A) The name of the franchisor, the name under which the fran-
chisor is doing or intends to do business, and the name of any parent or
affiliated company that will engage in business transactions with fran-
chisees.
(B) The franchisor's principal business address and the name and
address of an agent authorized to receive process under Civil Rule 4.2.
(C) The business form of the franchisor, whether corporate, part-
nership, or otherwise.
(D) Such information concerning the identity and business expe-
rience of persons affiliated with the franchisor, as the Division may by
rule prescribe.
(E) A statement whether any person identified in the application for
registration:
(1) has been convicted of a felony or held liable in a civil action by
final judgment if such felony or civil action involved fraud, embezzle-
ment, fraudulent conversion or misappropriation of property; or
(2) is subject to any currently effective order of the Securities and
Exchange Commission or the Securities Administrator of any state deny-
ing registration to or revoking or suspending the registration of such per-
son as a securities broker or dealer or investment advisor or is subject to
any currently effective order of any national securities association or na-
tional securities exchange suspending or expelling such person from mem-
bership in such association or exchange; or
(3) is subject to any currently effective order or ruling of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission; or
(4) is subject to any currently effective injunctive or restrictive order
relating to business activity as a result of an action brought by any pub-
lic agency or department, including without limitation, actions affecting
a license as a real estate broker or salesman.
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Such statement shall set forth the court, date of conviction or judg-
ment, any penalty imposed or damages assessed, or the date, nature and
issuer of such order.
(F) The length of time the franchisor has conducted a business of
the type to be operated by the franchisees, has granted franchises for such
business, and has granted franchises in other lines of business.
(G) A recent financial statement of the franchisor, together with a
statement of any material changes in the financial condition of the fran-
chisor from the date thereof. The Commissioner may by rule or order pre-
scribe:
(1) the form and content of financial statements required under
this section;
(2) the circumstances under which consolidated financial statements
shall be filed;
(3) the circumstances under which financial statements shall be au-
dited by independent certified public accountants or public accountants.
(H) A copy of the typical franchise contract or agreement pro-
posed for use or in use in this state.
(I) A statement of the franchise fee charged, the proposed applica-
tion of the proceeds of such fee by the franchisor and the formula by
which the amount of the fee is determined if the fee is not the same in all
cases.
(J) A statement describing any payments or fees other than fran-
chise fees that the franchisee or subfranchisor is required to pay to the
franchisor, including royalties and payments or fees which the franchisor
collects in whole or in part on behalf of a third party or parties,
(K) A statement of the conditions under which the franchise
agreement may be terminated or renewal refused, or repurchased at the
option of the franchisor.
(L) A statement as to whether, by the terms of the franchise agree-
ment or by other device or practice, the franchisee or subfranchisor is re-
quired to purchase from -the franchisor or his designee services, supplies,
products, fixtures or other goods relating to the establishment or opera-
tion of the franchise business, together with a description thereof.
(M) A statement as to whether, by the terms of the franchise agree-
ment or other device or practice, the franchisee is limited in the goods or
services offered by him to his customer.
(N) A statement of the terms and conditions of any financing ar-
rangements when offered directly or indirectly by the franchisor or his
agent or affiliate.
(0) A statement of any past or present practice or of any intent of
the franchisor to sell, assign or discount to a third party any note, con-
tract or other obligation of the franchisee or subfranchisor in whole or
in part.
(P) A copy of any statement of estimated or projected franchisee
earnings prepared for presentation to prospective franchisees or subfran-
chisors, or other persons, together with a statement setting forth the
data upon which such estimation or projection is based.
(Q) A statement of any compensation or other benefit given or
promised to a public figure arising, in whole or in part, from the use of
the public figure in the name or symbol of the franchise or the endorse-
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ment or recommendation of the franchise by the public figure in adver-
tisements.
(R) A statement of the number of franchises presently operating
and proposed to be sold, as may be required by rule of the Division.
(S) A statement as to whether franchisees or subfranchisors receive
an exclusive area or territory.
(T) Other information related to the application as the Division
may reasonably require.
(U) Other information as the franchisor may desire to present.
(V) When the person filing the application for registration is a.
subfranchisor, the application shall also indude the same information
concerning the subfranchisor as is required from the franchisor pursuant
to this section.
